On the one hand, her research challenges the attitudinal model by arguing that, while judges may be motivated by policy [*159] goals, judges sincerely believe they use the tools of legal reasoning to render their decisions.Judges beliefs that they are objectively applying the law stems from the reality that they are socialized, in law school and throughout their careers, to suppress their ideologies when adjudicating disputes.
Collins, Jr., Department of Political Science, University of North Texas. Political scientists studying law and courts have long adopted theories and methods from psychology into their analyses of judicial decision making.On the other hand, her research provides an expansion of the attitudinal model by way of providing the first solid theoretical account of motivated reasonings applicability to judicial choice.While Segal and Spaeth (2002: 433) briefly mention motivated reasoning, it is only an afterthought and they take no position as to whether judges consciously or unconsciously allow ideology to directly influence case outcomes.That is, the heart of the book provides empirical tests of two mechanisms of motivated reasoning. This is the idea that judges may view the similarity of case authority differently, contingent on whether a particular case enables them to further their policy goals.To test this hypothesis, Braman utilizes two experiments. Supreme Court case involving the Boy Scouts decision to dismiss a member of the organization after it was discovered he was homosexual.
This suggests that legal socialization does not necessarily attenuate motivated judgments in terms of analogical perception.